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Abstract—STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a new
hazard analysis technique which builds on STAMP, a process and
accident model using concepts of system and control theory. In
this paper, we present A-STPA an open tool to help transform
STPA to an executable STPA which automates the activities of
STPA. We develop the A-STPA tool to assist safety analysts
in performing STPA. Moreover, it will give the safety analysts
different views on the STPA hazard analysis process. We discuss
the design of the tool and illustrate its usage. So far, it is still
an early version but it can already help the safety analysts in
avoiding consistency defects. We are confident that A-STPA will
become a powerful tool support for STPA.
Index Terms—STAMP/STPA approach; safety analysis; hazard
analysis technique; tool support; Eclipse
I. INTRODUCTION
Hazard analysis is one of the most important elements
in developing safe systems. One of the most challenging
issues in safe system development today is to identify all
potential failures modes as well as unsafe interactions among
components of the system to ensure its safe function under
all conditions. Many hazard analysis techniques have been
proposed to investigate system design models and to elicit
hazards and design flaws [1].
The last few years have seen an increase in activity in using
ideas from systems thinking and systems theory to identify
hazards of systems. STPA is one of the approaches based on
these concepts [2]. The STPA approach has now been used
extensively on real-world systems (e.g. Japanese Exploration
Agency (JAXA) [3], space shuttle operations [4], railroad
safety in China [5] and the Darlington Shutdown System [6])
in different areas and there are indications that it is more
effective, less expensive and easier to use than traditional
approaches. Various researchers have used STPA for analysing
the hazards of complex systems in different areas in industry
such as space, aviation, medical, defence, nuclear, automotive
and food. This has led to increase the need for tool support
which helps in automatint the STPA approach.
We present the tool we have developed as well as the way it
can automate the steps of STPA approach: A-STPA. It is based
on the STPA hazard analysis technique and aims to automate
all activities during STPA such as establish fundamentals
of analysis, define/refine safety constraints, draw the control
structure diagram and edit the different tables of analysis
as far as possible. We developed the current version A-
STPA in a student project with third-year software engineering
students. Our tool is developed in Java and built on the Eclipse
platform, an open and extensible tool platform [7]. A-STPA
aims to provide an appropriate tool to support for conducting
STPA hazard analysis with controllability, completeness and
consistency to establish safety requirements completely and
consistently in the system design process.
A. Problem Statement
STAMP/STPA is a powerful hazard analysis approach which
has proven to be effective on real systems. Since STPA is a
new method, so far there is little tool support specifically for
STPA and its application was often done with standard office
suites, which needs unnecessarily high effort and is error-
prone.
B. Research Objectives
The overall objective of our research is to better understand
hazard analysis with STPA and improve its application in
practice. In this paper, we concentrate on providing tool
support to make using STPA more efficient. Hence, the goal
is to develop tool support to automate the STPA approach as
far as possible.
C. Contribution
We present a first version of A-STPA, a software to auto-
mate and support the application of STPA. This first version
contains the possibility to create all necessary lists (accidents
or hazards), diagrams and links between those documents. This
enables safety engineers to work efficiently with the lists and
diagrams created in STPA as well as avoid defects such as
inconsistencies between different documents.
D. Context
A-STPA is an open-source tool based on the Eclipse plat-
form which is developed as a student project in the software
engineering programme of the University of Stuttgart. The
student project started in April 2013 and will finish in Febru-
ary 2014. Our team consisted of 9 students and 3 teaching
assistants.
II. STAMP AND STPA
STPA (System-Theoretical Process Analysis) is a modern
hazard analysis method that is based on a new system-
theoretical model of accidents (STAMP) for identifying haz-
ards in large and complex systems. With STPA, the system
is viewed as an interaction of control loops and accidents are
described as results from inadequate enforcement of security
constraints in the design, development and operation. Over
the last years, this approach has received increasing attention.
Many experiences of applying the STAMP/STPA approach to
different systems in different areas have been documented.
STAMP/STPA as it was described in [8] is a top-down analysis
approach that considers the unsafe interactions between soft-
ware, hardware, operators, management and regulatory bodies.
We support the main steps of STPA, which are described in [2],
in our tool.
III. A-STPA OVERVIEW
A-STPA is our proposed tool for automating and supporting
conducting the STPA steps to help the analyst by ensuring that
important information is near at hand. In this section, we will
present how A-STPA supports the three steps of STPA.
We implemented A-STPA as open-source software on the
Eclipse platform. A-STPA follows directly the steps from the
STPA hazard analysis technique. It has the following main
functions:
1) Edit the fundamentals of the analysis
2) Link the conducted information during step 1 to the
other components in the next steps such as the hazards
link to the accidents and safety constraints which are
derived from the hazards.
3) Draw the control structure diagram
4) Edit tables such as the control actions table, unsafe
control action table and causal factors table
5) Augment the control structure diagram with a process
model
6) Export and import the STPA hazard analysis results
The overall structure for A-STPA is depicted in Figure 1.
There are four phases: (i) We provide the STPA components
data model for recording information for each component
that is generated during an STPA analysis with short/long
description; (ii) After editing this information, we add internal
mapping rules to map the information between the STPA steps
to facilitate the tracing between the three steps. For example,
we link hazards to certain accidents and extract the control
actions from the control structure diagram into the control
action table. (iii) We tabulate the analysis information in the
tables such as unsafe control action, corresponding safety
constraints and causal factors. (IV) We provide a semantic
control structure diagram editor in which the STPA compo-
nents (e.g. controller, sensor, actuator or controlled process)
can be sketched and linked. The process model can also be
only augmented into the controller components. It provides
semantic links between different components of the control
structure diagram according to the standard control loop which
was proposed by Leveson [2]. As the STPA approach is an
iterative process in which the three steps can be repeated, we
ensure the consistency between these three steps in our tool.
If the user changes something in a previous step or update the
control structure diagram, it will influence the next steps.
Figure 1. Overview of the Structure of A-STPA
IV. VIEWS IN A-STPA
In this section, we describe the user interface of the tool
and its usage.
The A-STPA user interface consists of several views, as
shown in Figure 2. In the welcome view and the main menu
view, the user can manage the A-STPA project (e.g. creating
a project and editing its description or loading and saving a
project). In the STPA explorer, a user can edit and manage all
activities of the STPA steps such as creating and editing the
fundamentals of a projects (e.g. managing accidents, hazards,
system goals, design requirements and safety constraints). In
the accident and hazard links view, the user can link the
hazards that can lead to a certain accident and vice versa.
The accident can be linked to the hazards to show how the
accident could occur. The control structure view is used to
draw and manage the control structure of the system. The
components model of a control structure diagram consists of
several elements as shown on the top right in Figure 2 (e.g.
controller component, actuator component, sensor component,
controlled process component, the links between them and the
text-field component).
Figure 2. Control Structure Diagram View of A-STPA
In the control actions view, all control actions (links
between components) in the control structure diagram will
automatically import in the control action table. Also, the user
can manage and add more control actions into this table. The
view of unsafe control actions is used to manage the control
actions according to four types of inadequate control which are
described in more detail in [2]: Not Given, Given Incorrectly,
Wrong Timing or Order and Stopped Too Soon or Applied
Too Long. The users have to evaluate each unsafe control
action and determine whether it is hazardous or not as defined
by system-level hazards (hazards view, step 1). If the unsafe
control action leads to a hazardous state, then the user can link
the unsafe control action to its related hazards.
In the view corresponding safety constraints, the unsafe
control actions which are checked with the hazardous states
in the unsafe control action view will automatically import in
the corresponding safety constraints table. The user can refine
and edit the safety constraints here derived from the unsafe
control actions. To augment a process model into a controller,
the control structure diagram, which is sketched in the control
structure view, is automatically imported into this view and the
user can drag and drop the process model component with its
variables only into a controller component. Thecausal factor
view is used to manage the causal factors for the various parts
of the control structure diagram (control structure diagram
view). The user can refine the safety constraints of the system
and document them in the causal table. Also, the users can
edit their recommendations for additional mitigations.
The results of A-STPA are documented in an XML-
specifications [9] as an external representation to facilitate
versioning, backup and possible future integration with other
tools. The results can be also exported as a PDF file in a
human-readable form to give them to other stakeholders.
V. CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS
A big challenge that we faced at the beginning of the A-
STPA development was that all our students had no idea
or previous experiences on the topic of safety and hazard
analysis. To overcome this challenge, we arranged tutorials on
using STPA and ran a seminar on STAMP/STPA to increase
the understanding of the approach and how it might be
implemented it as an executable tool.
The major issue which we are facing during the develop-
ment of A-STPA is that there are no rigorous procedures,
guidances and rules on drawing control loop and standard no-
tations to document casual factors. From that, several questions
arose: (1) Who can connect to whom in the control loop? (2)
Can the actuator connect directly to the sensor? We spend
much effort on deciding on these issues. Especially how we
shall implement the drawing rules and links between different
components in the control loop as well as on which way we
shall document the causal analysis results during step 3 of
STPA caused many discussions. It is also not clear in the
current publications how the process model parameters are
used during the causal factor analysis to identify inadequate
control.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Based on our earlier work on applying STPA to the auto-
motive domain [10], we have developed tool support to assist
safety analysts during the STPA hazard analysis process. Our
tool called A-STPA aims at automating the steps of STPA.
This tool is implemented in Java as an open source tool on
the Eclipse platform. This paper presents the first functional
version of our tool. We are currently working on improving
the usability and test it intensively.
A major topic of our future work is to provide an integrated
simulation of the causal analysis process (step 3) to aid safety
analysts in performing the causal analysis to determine how
potentially inadequate control action could occur. We aim also
to conduct an online empirical evaluation study on using this
tool by safety experts during their work on applying STPA to
real systems in industry. Finally, as we will release A-STPA
as open source, we hope to attract others in working with us
on various improvements of the tool.
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